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A CHANCE TO BE HEARD: THOUGHTS ABOUT
SCHEDULES, CAPS, AND COLLATERAL SOURCE
DEDUCTIONS IN THE SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
Stephan Landsman*

INTRODUCTION

I was standing in the locker room of the YMCA in Evanston, Illinois, when I first saw the pictures of the World Trade Center. The
television images of a smoldering building with a gash in its side
seemed like a bizarre clip from a Bruce Willis movie. As events unfolded, unreality was transformed into shock and horror. My thoughts
turned to New York friends, the Sears Tower (in Chicago), and a hundred other nightmares. Over the next forty-eight hours, I renewed
long-neglected connections to reassure and be reassured. Something
enormous and frightening had occurred. It touched my life and the
lives of those around me with an unparalleled immediacy. The disaster was both real and personal. This was not about a grainy set of
photographs from a far off Dallas street, but about the skyscraper
three blocks from my office. It was not about a national day of
mourning for a fallen leader, but about whether I could ever again get
on an airplane. There was a crisis and it was a crisis in my life.
One of the swiftest and most remarkable reactions among Americans to the September l1th attack was a desire to help the victims in
some tangible way. This led to the donation of countless pints of
blood and more than one billion dollars in charitable contributions.
We all wanted to be doing or sending something. It was into this
maelstrom of strong emotions and desires that our political leaders
stepped in the aftermath of calamity. To our wish to help, they added
the rhetoric of war and heroism. The President and his advisors declared a war on terrorism. This was to be real war with combat, casualties, security restrictions, and sacrifice. It was also a time to honor
heroes. The brave New York policemen, firemen, and EMS workers
who charged into the burning towers were on all of our minds. Their
courage and sacrifice inspired us all. Their deeds, it soon emerged,
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College of
Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon College; J.D. 1972, Harvard University.
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had been matched by those of the passengers and crew on one of the
flights who had fought back against their hijackers and salvaged something of a victory for all of us by thwarting the terrorists' apparent
plan to crash their plane into some Washington, D.C. target.
Into this highly charged environment stepped the well-organized
lobbyists of the American airline industry seeking assistance for their
badly battered clients. Their objective was to secure a bailout for the
industry. According to the New York Times,' by Thursday, September
20, 2001, the basic structure of rescue legislation had been hammered
out. There remained, however, one key sticking point. Democratic
legislators insisted "that there would be no deal ... without compensation for [the] victims."'2 Representatives of President George W.
Bush proposed a single consolidated lawsuit in Manhattan with government payment to be made only if the claimants were able to prove
liability and after the exhaustion of airline insurance coverage. The
Democrats rejected this proposal and insisted on the creation of a
government fund. The details of such a fund were negotiated over the
next twenty-four hours (ending at 4:00 a.m. on Friday, September 21).
According to the New York Times, the fund concept was attacked
by Republican lawmakers as a potentially huge expenditure that was
inequitable to victims of prior terrorist acts like the Oklahoma City
bombing. 3 Despite these complaints, the Democrats held firm. In
deference to Republican budgetary concerns, however, a provision
was inserted in the legislation requiring that the compensation to be
paid to victims by the fund would be reduced on a dollar-for-dollar
basis to reflect any "collateral source" payments (like life insurance
benefits or pension plan payouts) that victims might receive. Furthermore, Republicans insisted that the administrator of the fund, the socalled Special Master to be appointed by the Attorney General, be
given broad managerial and adjudicative powers so he might protect
the government fisc insofar as possible given the objectives of the
fund. With this balancing of the conflicting desires to care for the victims and control government expenditures, fund legislation was
drafted and inserted into the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act. 4 The Act was signed into law by the President on
September 22, 2001.
1. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Fund for Victim's Families Already Proves Sore
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§ 405(b)(1)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. 230, 238 (2001).
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This victim compensation program is unprecedented. No such fund
was established for victims of prior terrorist activities, including the
1988 destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the
1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, or the attacks in 1998 on two American embassies in East Africa. In fact, a
blank check for government compensation to those injured by what
might be described as tortious or criminal third party conduct is
unique in American legal experience. The only thing that can explain
such an outcome is the singular alignment of a variety of forces all
pulling in the same direction at once, a syzygy of political and social
planets lined up at a unique moment in time. Here, those forces included the bailout of the airlines, the rhetoric of heroism that clothed
a significant number of the victims, and the widespread desire among
Americans to contribute something to help ameliorate the suffering of
the victims of the attacks.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 was attached to legislation intended to assist the American airline industry
in recovering from the effects of the terrorist acts that destroyed four
aircraft as well as the World Trade Center and severely damaged a
wing of the Pentagon. The airline industry received a range of benefits from the legislation. These included federal loan guarantees of up
to $10 billion, 5 compensation of up to $5 billion for "direct losses incurred beginning on September 11, 2001, by air carriers as a result of
any Federal ground stop order,"'6 and compensation for "incremental
losses" from September 11 to December 31, 2001. 7 The Act also provided the airlines with reimbursement for any increase in the cost of
insurance through October 1, 2002,8 as well as a cash flow benefit
from the deferral of the deposit-of excise taxes. 9
The airlines' benefit package was rounded out by the creation of the
September 11th Fund itself. The Fund was not simply a promise to
help victims or recompense heroes, but a part of the bailout of the
aviation industry. Anyone who elected compensation under the provisions of the Fund was foreclosed from filing suit to recover "damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes."' 0
5. Id. § 101(a)(1).
6. Id. § 101(a)(2)(A).
7. Id. § 101(a)(2)(B).
8. Id. § 201(b).
9. Id. § 301(a)(1).
10. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
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Moreover, even if an injured individual sought to proceed in court
(foregoing any claim under the provisions of the Fund), his or her
prospects were drastically curtailed by section 408 of the Act, which
created a single exclusive cause of action and imposed a strict "limitation on air carrier liability."11 The total "liability for all claims,
whether for compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air
carrier should not be in an amount greater than the limits of the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier."'1 2 In other words, apart
from the Fund, payments to all claimants including the owners of
damaged or destroyed property, businesses suffering disruptions, and
individuals experiencing personal injuries were capped at a level dictated by the airlines' insurance coverage (a sum far smaller than all
the losses suffered). Moreover, section 408 created one exclusive
venue for all claims arising out of the hijackings by requiring that all
such cases be heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In essence, this section of the Act reduced
the number of non-Fund remedies to one, required that all claimants
be placed in a single pool of such enormous dimensions that none of
the claimants would be likely to recover anything close to full compensation, and virtually guaranteed protracted litigation of great
complexity.
A key question about this legislation is whether it works a de facto
cancellation of the right to proceed in court (rather than providing a
choice of remedies as it claims) and, if so, whether it is lawful to deny
injured individuals access to remedies that existed when they were
hurt and require them to rely on a fund for compensation instead. As
to the first question, while it is clear that the legislation does not bar
litigation by injured individuals, it does narrow their choices so severely (cutting off all state court proceedings, establishing a single federal cause of action that must be tried in the Southern District of New
York, and capping compensation to all business and individual claimants) that a balanced assessment might conclude that only the shell of
a court-based litigation option remains for injured individuals. If it is
assumed that the September 11th victims have been stripped of their
right to proceed in court, then the question arises as to the lawfulness
of such a step.
The legal legitimacy of such legislative action is not entirely clear.
There are, however, several United States Supreme Court decisions
11. Id. § 408.
12. Id. § 408(a).
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suggesting that such a result is not unlawful so long as affected litigants are provided "a fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain
recovery of damages.' 3 One of these cases, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,14 involved the passage of the PriceAnderson Act,' 5 which imposed a $560 million cap on liability for nuclear accidents arising out of the operation of private federally-licensed nuclear power plants. The same legislation created a $560
million fund for indemnification purposes and required injured parties
to waive all other claims in order to participate in the fund. The PriceAnderson Act did leave open the possibility that Congress might supplement the fund in case of a disaster, but made no promise to that
effect. The Supreme Court upheld the legislation against a variety of
due process and other constitutional challenges, stressing its provision
of a speedy and reasonably well-funded alternative to litigation. The
Court cited with approval its earlier decision upholding the New York
Workmen's Compensation Act in which it declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied if workers who
have lost the right to sue are provided "moderate compensation in all
cases of injury, and [have] a certain and speedy remedy without the
difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the
amount of the damages. ' 16 According to the Court, such programs
are defensible so long as they guarantee "a reasonably just substitute
7
for the common-law rights replaced.'
A second case to uphold a substitution of remedies, although in a
significantly different context, was Dames & Moore v. Regan. 18
There, the Supreme Court recognized the President's power to suspend private legal claims against Iran in the wake of the hostage crisis
and substitute in their place a Claims Tribunal. The Court's decision
was based largely on the President's great latitude to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States. The Court, however, accepted the
suspension of litigation for the additional reason that the administration "provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is capable of providing meaningful relief." 19
Duke Power, Dames & More, and New York Central Railway Company strongly suggest that the right to sue may be taken but that there
is a clear expectation that a reasonable substitute will be provided.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 91 (1978).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 201 (1917).
Duke Power Co. , 438 U.S. at 92.
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Id. at 687.
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Whatever Congress had in mind when it created the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, these opinions impose some constraints
on what can be done with respect to victims' claims. Congress was
under a legal obligation to provide something approximating "a fair
'20
and reasonable substitute.
What Congress mandated for victims was a program it said was intended to "provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed.12 1 The
compensation to be provided was spelled out in the Act and included
both "economic loss," which was defined as:
[A]ny pecuniary loss resulting from harm (including the loss of
earnings or other benefits related to employment, medical expense
loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial costs, and
loss of business or employment opportunities).to the extent recov22
ery for such loss is allowed under applicable State law
and "noneconomic losses," which were defined as: "[L]osses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society
and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic
service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpe'23
cuniary losses of any kind or nature.
These definitions are extremely expansive and recognize a broader
range of compensable losses than those recognized in virtually any
state, most particularly with respect to "hedonic damages. ' 24 The
Special Master was charged by the legislation to review each victim's
claim and, with respect to eligible individuals, determine: "(i) the extent of the harm to the claimant, including any economic and
noneconomic losses; and (ii) the amount of compensation to which the
claimant is entitled based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the
claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant. '25
The legislation did not make any provision for the capping of
awards or for reductions to reflect the reduced "need" of the well-todo. It did, however, specify that awards were to be reduced by collateral source payments received by victims. These were defined as:
"[A]I1 collateral sources, including life insurance, pension funds, death
benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local govern20. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 91.
21. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 403, 115
Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
22. Id. § 402(5).
23. Id. § 402(7).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B).
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ments related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11,
2001. ,, 26 Claimants were entitled to hearings at which they might be
represented by counsel and at which witnesses and documents could
be presented. 27 The award determination of the Special Master was to
be final and unappealable. 28 Submission of a claim to the Special
29
Master cut off the right to file a civil action.
With respect to the victims, this program did not, on its face, seem
to be crafted as a charitable endeavor to help the needy. Rather, it
seemed designed to provide a remedy similar to that available in a tort
proceeding, minus collateral source payments. The legislation appeared to share the widespread public desire to do something tangible
and generous for victims and provide a significant gesture to the heroic uniformed victims, all of whom were covered by the terms of the
Fund. Fiscal concerns were addressed by use of the collateral source
mechanism. The legislation seemed to contemplate real hearings at
which documentary proof and testimony could be presented. (This
suggestion must be tempered by recognition of the short processing
periods specified in the legislation and its emphasis on claim forms.)
III.

THE SPECIAL MASTER COMES ON THE SCENEPROMULGATION OF THE INTERIM FINAL RULE

Kenneth Feinberg was designated Special Master on November 26,
2001 and, as required by the statute, issued regulations, entitled the
"Interim Final Rule," on December 21 of the same year. 30 (Section
407 of the Act required promulgation of regulations no later than
ninety days after the signing of the legislation.) The regulations were
preceded by a "Statement" in which the Special Master endeavored to
explain his approach to the Fund program and his rationale for the
regulations he was putting in place. His opening paragraph set out his
view of the nature of the Fund. He described it as "an unprecedented
expression of compassion" that was "designed to bring some measure
of financial relief ...to those most in need. '31 This formulation was
strikingly different from the "compensation" language used in the Act
itself. By such verbiage, the Special Master transformed the Fund into
a vehicle for charity. Benefits were no longer conceptualized in terms
26. Id. § 402(4).
27. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(4).
28. Id. § 405(b)(3).
29. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
30. September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001).
31. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274 (emphasis added).
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of the payment of proven economic and noneconomic losses, but
rather, as the Special Master's assessment of needed relief. The revocation of the right to sue and the operation of the fund as a substitute
for that right had been replaced by notions of charitable generosity
controlled by a nearly all-powerful bureaucrat.
The Special Master stated that the regulations he drafted had two
objectives: "[t]o provide fair, predictable and consistent compensation" and "to do so in an expedited, efficient manner without unnecessary bureaucracy and needless demands on the victims." '3 2 The Master
contrasted his approach with that of the courts which he said were
inefficient, uncertain, and costly. He defended his approach to the
structuring of the Fund's operations by arguing that it would provide
"speedy and efficient compensation, which will help bring some closure to the events of September 11." 33 The emphasis was now on
need, predictability, and a horizontal equity that, as far as possible,
would treat all claimants equally. The Master's vision was of a process
without any significant number of formal hearings that would dole out
needed dollar awards without requiring victims to "revisit the tragic
events of September 11 over and over again. ' 34 A chance to voice
one's feelings, speak about one's loss, or otherwise individualize the
process was not seen as essential.
In line with the Special Master's ideas about charitable relief for the
needy, efficiency of assessment, and horizontal equity, the regulations
established a methodology for calculating awards that seems a radical
departure from what Congress had originally envisioned. The Master
proposed a cabining of awards within predetermined limits-highs
and lows were to be excised. Feinberg's rationale for what was, in
essence, a system with a presumptive cap and floor was as follows:
We have concluded that any methodology that does nothing more
than attempt to replicate a theoretically possible future income
stream would lead to awards that would be insufficient relative to
the needs of some victims' families, and excessive relative to the
needs of others. The statute specifies that individual circumstances
beyond economic and noneconomic harm should be taken into account. It is our view that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
awards in excess of $3 million, tax-free, will rarely be appropriate in
light of individual needs and resources. At the same time, we want
to ensure that victims' families are receiving at least a minimum
level of resources to help meet their needs and rebuild their lives.
Thus, we have concluded that families of deceased victims should
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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receive a combined total of at least $500,000 from this program,
other state and Federal programs, life insurance policies and other
sources of compensation. Similarly, the baseline for single decedents should be $300,000. This ensures that every needy claimant's
total compensation from this program and
other sources will be at
35
least equal to these threshold amounts.
A close examination of the legislation does not seem to support the
Special Master's assertions about need-based reductions of awards.
By something like fiat, the Special Master had changed the character
of the program.
The Special Master had to overcome a number of obstacles to accomplish this award-limiting goal. Perhaps the most formidable was
Congress's exceedingly expansive definitions of economic and
noneconomic losses. He therefore discussed the measurement of
damages at some length in his Statement. Again, he began by stating
two objectives, not surprisingly, similar to those he had previously set
out regarding his overall administration of the Fund. His first objective with respect to the assessment of loss was "that the process should
'36
be efficient, straightforward, and understandable to the claimants.
The second was "that each claimant should, to the greatest extent possible, be treated fairly based on the claimant's own individual circumstances and relative to other claimants. ' 37 It is interesting to compare
these objectives with those of the legislation. Full compensation has
been downplayed and horizontal equity highlighted, hence redefining
the notion of fairness. This is a logical shift in light of the Master's
desire to justify an economic loss calculation methodology that proposes a cap (albeit one described as "presumptive") and is premised
on a pre-established schedule.
In the name of an allegedly efficient, user friendly, and equitable
approach, virtually all grounds for proof, contest, and argument were
read out of the Fund process. In their place, the Master substituted
charts and schedules that specified to the dollar how much individuals
of a specified age, with a specified income, and a specified number of
dependents could expect to receive. Gone was any need for a claimant to say anything at a hearing-a few simple facts jotted on a form
would yield a precise and unvarying award. The Special Master
warned that claimants should not expect variations from his schedule
of economic loss and, more particularly, no awards in excess of the top
schedule figures. In making the latter point, he said there were not
35. Id. at 66,274-75.
36. Id. at 66.278.
37. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,278.
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likely to be "awards grossly in excess of the highest awards listed in
the Special Master's presumed award chart. '38 That chart calculated
awards for incomes up to the ninety-eighth percentile of individual
incomes in the United States. The Special Master stated that victims
with incomes above the ninety-eighth percentile level should not expect full compensation. The Master left some room for the presentation of "extraordinary circumstances" at a hearing but provided
virtually no guidance about what such circumstances might be and
how they might be established. What rings in the ear is the Master's
insistence on caps and his schedule methodology. He said of the
wealthiest potential claimants: "[M]ulti-million dollar awards out of
the public coffers are not necessary to provide them with a strong economic foundation from which to rebuild their lives."'39 The focus had
shifted from loss to need. This was a remodeling of the Fund to suit
objectives like charity, fiscal restraint, horizontal equity, and efficiency, rather than the statutory objectives that appeared to mirror
those of tort law.
The effort to contain awards and impose horizontal equity was carried even further with respect to noneconomic losses. Despite a strikingly liberal standard for the calculation of noneconomic losses, the
Special Master decreed a flat and fixed presumed award for all those
who died: "The presumed noneconomic losses for decedents shall be
$250,000 plus an additional $50,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim. Such presumed losses include a
noneconomic component of replacement services loss. ' ' 40 Claimants
could seek to prove "extraordinary circumstances" that might justify
departure from this fixed sum, but they were given no guidance or
encouragement.
The next matter addressed by the Special Master was the nature of
the hearings to be made available to claimants. The regulations proposed two alternatives: Track A and Track B. The first track involved
the submission of a set of forms and the Master's calculation of a presumed award. The claimant might then accept the award or seek a
hearing at which he or she would be permitted to show "extraordinary
circumstances indicating that the presumed award does not adequately address the claimant's injury. '4 1 The focus of the whole process was the monetary award, pure and simple. If the claimant opted
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233,
11,246 (Mar. 13, 2002).
41. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.
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for Track B, there was no presumed award, but rather an immediate
hearing at which "the Special Master or his designee will utilize the
presumed award methodology, but may modify or vary the award if
the claimant presents extraordinary circumstances. ' 42 Although the
sequencing was varied, there did not seem to be much substantive difference between the two approaches. Both led back to the Special
Master's schedules and methodology. The likelihood of a robust hearing was virtually nonexistent, as the Special Master seemed to suggest
when he said that hearings on both tracks were "generally not to ex'43
ceed two hours.
Although the Special Master insisted that hearings were to be
"nonadversarial," the Master or his designee was authorized "to question witnesses and examine the credentials of experts. '44 Moreover,
the Special Master recognized in section 104.71 of the regulations that
it was the function of his staff (including, apparently, hearing officers)
to "prevent and detect fraud. ' 45 Taken together, these regulations indicate that, on a significant number of occasions, victims and decisionmakers will be in an adversarial posture. This arrangement raises the
specter of clashes between adjudicator and claimant (or claimant's
counsel) that may make the process appear one-sided and unfair.
Such clashes may also compound the claimant's injury with the insult
of an inquisitorial examination. Moreover, because the decisionmaker is not obligated under the regulations to "create or provide any
written record of deliberations" 46 and all decisions by the Special
Master are final, there is potential for the process to appear arbitrary
and hostile to victims and their families.
The reaction to the Special Master's regulations was not entirely
favorable. Both claimants and their support groups were sharply critical of the presumptive caps on economic and noneconomic losses as
well as the presumptive awards methodology itself. Many were also
concerned about the collateral source rule, which had the apparent
effect of reducing a significant number of awards, especially those of
uniformed victims, to very low levels (because of the generous benefits provided under other programs to individuals killed in the line of
duty). There was a great deal of criticism of the Special Master's failure to include "domestic partners" (unmarried or of the same sex) to
the list of those eligible for benefits. Amnesty International called for
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 66,280.
Id. at 66,285.
Id. at 66,287.
67 Fed. Reg. at 11,246.
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"equal access to benefits under the Fund for all victims, regardless of
sexual orientation or marital status. ' 47 Separate from concern about
the number of dollars to be awarded, a great deal of anger, frustration,
and distrust was voiced about the structure of the process proposed by
the Special Master. A number of concerned parties felt that the process prevented claimants from having a say about their loss. Some
critics focused particular attention on the two-hour limitation on hearings. The Fund seemed to be working to reduce valued lives to a cutand-dried formula. Moreover, the Special Master was asking victims
to place all their trust in him without any precedent by which to judge
his conduct and no possibility of appellate review of his decisions.
Victims were given no clear reason to trust the Master and no procedural protections from his arbitrary exercise of discretion.
IV.

THE SPECIAL MASTER REFINES

His

REGULATIONS

On March 7, 2002, Kenneth Feinberg responded to the criticisms of
the Interim Final Rule by announcing the promulgation of the "Final
Rule" for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. His response to earlier criticism is revealing. As with the Interim Final
Rule, the revised regulations are introduced by a Statement from the
Special Master. This Statement begins by declaring:
Since December 21, 2001, the date of the promulgation of the interim final rule, I have been engaged in meetings and conversations
with September 11 victims, their families, public officials, representatives of private charities and interested concerned citizens of our
nation and foreign nations as well. I have listened carefully to both
supporters and critics of the interim final rule. I have benefited tremendously from their input. I believe that, as a direct result of that
varying input, this final rule constitutes a product worthy of support
interested in a just, fair and efficient compensation
by all those
48
program.
The impression one gets from this declaration is that Feinberg is a
man who is personally committed to the success of the Fund effort,
but is decidedly sensitive about reactions to his initial work. In defense of his original proposals, he almost immediately cites laudatory
remarks from Newsweek, the New York Times, the New York Daily
News, and the Washington Post. While these media remarks offer
some solace, there are no encomiums from victims or political figures.
It may not be unfounded speculation to suggest that the Master felt
himself under significant and critical scrutiny.
47. Id. at 11,242.
48. Id. at 11,233.
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The Master's response to his critics lists nine bullet points. The first
eight of these are all focused on increasing the size of the payouts to
be provided by the Fund. It almost seems as if the Special Master
decided to sweeten the Fund "pot" in order to deflect criticism or reacted to criticism by assuming that all objections are ultimately about
economics. How does he do it? First, by defining collateral source
payments narrowly, thereby leaving more dollars in claimants' awards.
Second, by promising to exercise his "discretion" to adjust collateral
source offsets in a downward direction whenever possible. Third, by
doubling awards to the spouses and children of deceased victims from
$50,000 to $100,000 each for noneconomic losses. He makes this
change despite a curious insistence that his prior (smaller), presumptively binding noneconomic losses assessment was correct. 49 One is
left to wonder why a doubling was warranted if the prior evaluation
was proper and whether the numbers in both cases are anything other
than arbitrary. Fourth, adjustments are made to the economic loss
calculation methodology that are likely to increase awards. Fifth, the
Master announced a "Policy Toward Final Awards" that amounts to a
virtual promise that almost no claimant will get less than $250,000 in
cash from the Fund. As Mr. Feinberg puts it:
Having personally met with thousands of individual family members, discussing with them their various needs, I anticipate that,
when the total needs of deceased victims' families are considered, it
will be very rare that a claimant will receive less than $250,000, except in unusual situations where a claimant has already
received
50
very substantial compensation from collateral sources.
All of this, especially the emphasis on discretion and the virtual
promises, appear to amount to a plea by the Special Master that
claimants should "trust him." If they do so, he seems to be assuring
them, they will be rewarded handsomely. The problem with such an
arrangement is that it locates virtually all power and "say" in the Special Master. Benevolence replaces process.
It is not until the ninth, and last, bullet point that a process-related
issue is addressed. The Master rescinds his "suggested two-hour hearing limitation" 51 and recognizes the possibility that some hearings may
be longer. It is only in this step that there is even an inkling that
allowing people time to be heard has value, that hearings with real
49. "While the Department and the Special Master believe that the original presumed award
charts are entirely sound and are based upon neutral, current data and generally accepted methodologies, the public comments did suggest certain adjustments that we determined were appropriate to implement." Id. at 11,237.
50. Id. at 11,234.
51. Id.
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evidence might have some part to play in the Fund process, and that
the Master's initial efforts in this regard may not have been wholly
adequate. In defending his time limit change, Mr. Feinberg inadvertently reveals that his original approach may have been infected by
one-size-fits-all thinking:
Congress offered little guidance regarding the procedural framework for resolving claims. Nevertheless, we have provided varied
procedural options for applicants because we know that one size
and one system will not fit all. Victims who so choose may take a
simple and direct route filing forms and accepting payment within a
matter of weeks. Other victims may opt for a more detailed and
lengthy process, electing for a hearing and exercising their
opportunity to present their cases personally in greater detail.5 2
Circumstances were exactly the same when the December Interim Final Rule fixing the original two-hour limit was adopted. The only
change since that time seems to have been criticism of the Special
Master's resistance to extended substantive hearings. Although one
still has ample grounds to doubt any change of heart by the Special
Master, the abandoning of the two-hour limit at least indicates that
criticisms about truncated process have been heard.
At the end of his Statement, the Special Master defends his program against the charge that it imposes a cap on recovery. Although
he denies that there is any ceiling on awards, he "still anticipate[s] that
awards in excess of $3 or $4 million will be rare. '53 One is left to
ponder the words and form of expression chosen. There is no cap, but
results seem locked in. The cavalier use of "$3 or $4 million" suggests
a looseness with figures that is belied by the Fund's charts, schedules,
and presumptive awards. One senses a benevolent but inflexible
Master speaking-he seems to be saying "I will listen, but my mind is
made up."
As things stand, there is a great deal to praise and to criticize in the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. It provides a
critical component in the package needed to bail out a truly endangered airline industry. It also represents a unique governmental effort
to reach out to individuals hurt in a man-made disaster and compensate them for their losses. The amounts of compensation it proposes
are far more generous than awards made in any past program. These
are remarkable achievements and suggest the possibility of a whole
new way of approaching otherwise intractable problems caused by
human misconduct or miscalculation. What is missing is sensitivity to
52. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,234.
53. Id.
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the need of claimants for a process that helps them come to emotional
and psychological terms with their loss, or persuades onlookers of its
integrity and legitimacy, by providing transparent and participatory
proceedings. These problems begin with Congress's legislation, which
cuts off any real opportunity for a day in court and substitutes an illdefined claims process. As the manager of the claims mechanism,
Congress installed an exceedingly powerful decision maker, vested
with broad authority to craft and run the program. Congress provided
that the Special Master's decisions would be final and unappealable.
At each of these turns, Congress weakened the appearance of integrity and accountability and narrowed the prospect that victims would
get an opportunity to be heard.
The Special Master compounded the process problems of the September 11th Fund. In his Interim Final Rule, he put in place what he
viewed as an efficient process designed to serve the needy and achieve
horizontal equity wherever possible. To achieve his ends, the Special
Master shifted as much of the Fund's work as possible to paper rather
than viva voce hearings. He established a "presumed" figure for
noneconomic losses and created a capped schedule for economic loss.
In both cases he short-circuited the need for testimonial hearings.
When he was done, there was virtually no room for claimants to voice
their feelings, talk about their loss, or present proof about anything.
Hearings, such as they were, had a two-hour time limit. On top of
this, the process created situations in which the Special Master or his
hearing officers could easily become the claimants' antagonists. If a
claimant became dissatisfied, there was nowhere he or she could turn
because the Special Master's decisions were final. This was not a process designed for claimant participation or control. Everything was
removed from the claimant's hands. Although some modest process
improvements were made in the Special Master's Final Rule, the
Fund's autocratic character remained intact. Hearings might last
more than two hours (although this was by no means encouraged), but
presumptive awards, caps, and schedules still held sway. There was no
more room for proof and nothing to curb hearing officers' potential
antagonism.
V.

SOCIAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS ABOUT PROCESS VALUES

Even a cursory reading of the Special Master's Statements and the
regulations of the Fund reflect Kenneth Feinberg's good faith in attempting to fashion a generous program designed to get substantial
benefits quickly into the hands of September 11th victims. What is at
least as clear is the Special Master's rejection of process values in the
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operation of such a program. Over the last quarter century, social
scientists have closely examined the role of procedure in securing participant satisfaction with respect to any program designed to resolve
disputes or provide compensation. The path-breaking work in the
area was the 1975 book by John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, entitled
ProceduralJustice.54 That book concluded, on the strength of a powerful array of laboratory experiments, that process, not just bottomline results, counts. If a process is seen as fair, claimants are more
likely to be satisfied with decisions whether favorable or not. If, on
the other hand, the process is perceived as unfair or unfriendly, even
favorable outcomes or rich payoffs may not yield participant satisfaction. Jonathan Casper and his colleagues used Thibaut and Walker's
idea to study 628 felony defendants' reactions to the outcomes of their
cases (heard in three different American cities).5 5 They found that
felony defendants were acutely sensitive to the fairness of the procedures used in their cases and that this sensitivity had a significant impact on their satisfaction with the process. As Casper and colleagues
stated in their conclusion:
[O]ur data suggest that procedural and distributive justice play a
role in litigant satisfaction even when the stakes are quite high. Our
litigants were all involved in felony cases. Half received outcomes
that included incarceration, a third went to prison, and all faced the
possibility of serious sanctions. Their evaluations of their treatment, however, do not appear to depend exclusively upon the
favorability of their sentences. Rather, their sense of fairness-in
terms of both procedural and distributive56justice-appears to have
substantially influenced their evaluations.
Similar results have been found in the cases of civil litigants in federal
court (with claims up to $800,000). E. Allan Lind and others looked
at the willingness of civil litigants to accept mediation awards rather
than proceed to a formal trial. 57 This team found that the decision
whether to accept a mediator's proposal was premised on an assessment of the procedural qualities of the mediation session rather than
its outcome. Perceptions of fairness count and can deeply influence
litigant behavior.
What sorts of procedures will be seen as fair and conducive to satisfaction? Thibaut and Walker, using a set of elaborate and imaginative
54.

W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
(1975).
55. Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, ProceduralJustice in Felony Cases, 22
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 483, 488 (1988).
56. Id. at 503.
57. See E. Allan Lind, C.A. Kulik & M. de Vera Park, Individual and CorporateDispute ResoJOHN
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surrogates for inquisitorial and adversarial processes, both in the
United States and elsewhere, found that the key to satisfaction is a
process that tends "to preserve equal access to channels of information and to mechanisms of control. 5 8s Individuals placed in the experimental position of claimant appear to find greatest satisfaction in an
adversarial system where they, rather than the decision-maker, are
empowered to control the flow of evidence. 59 By contrast, inquisitorial processes with an all-powerful inquiring magistrate were not
found by Thibault and Walker to encourage satisfaction. It takes very
little analysis to see that the September 11th Fund process fixed by the
Special Master is insensitive to claimant satisfaction, at least in the
terms framed by Thibault and Walker. With his schedules of economic loss, presumed noneconomic losses figure, and limiting approach to the presentation of proof at hearings, the Special Master has
cut off virtually all claimant participation (let alone sense of control).
The process mandated has virtually nothing to recommend it in procedural justice terms. Its difficulties are compounded by the dominant
and unreviewable position ceded to the Special Master.
A benefit of hearings and one of the key reasons they encourage
people to feel fairly treated is that they offer participants what social
scientists call "voice." When people are allowed voice-when they
can speak up and are listened to-they tend to react positively. Tom
Tyler and his co-authors have summarized the research findings on
voice:
Crime suspects feel more fairly treated if they are allowed to speak
about how they should be treated. Victims and their families also
feel more fairly treated if they can speak about how a criminal
should be sentenced. Workers feel more fairly treated if they can
present evidence about their contributions before pay and promotion decisions. And students feel more fairly treated if they have
greater opportunities to present evidence of their abilities before
grades are determined. Consider one example-child custody hearings. In such situations, mothers typically win (90 percent of the
time

. .

.). However, fathers feel more satisfied with the hearings if

the court allows them to present their cases and speak about60 their
wishes, even in situations in which they do not win custody.
Voice is so important that it can powerfully influence satisfaction in a
positive direction even in situations in which claimants are not al58. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 54, at 115.
59. Id. at 117-24.
60. TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANS, HEATHER J. SMITH &
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 88-89 (1997) (citations omitted).
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lowed to speak until after a decision has been made. 6 1 The September
11th Fund regulations make virtually no allowance for voice. Efficient
paper processes that avoid hearings are at the heart of the machinery.
No one is instructed to take the time to listen to the victims. No time
is set aside for stories of loss or the value of what is gone.
Procedures that lend voice can have a number of beneficial effects.
One that has been emphasized in the social science literature is enhancement of litigant dignity. E. Allan Lind and a high-powered team
62
of scholars studied tort litigants in a number of different locations.
They were interested in finding out the effects of traditional and alternative litigation procedures on those involved in the tort system. One
of their findings was that traditional court-based hearings were
powerfully attractive and satisfying to their sample of litigants. One
of the main reasons for this, the researchers hypothesized, was that
traditional processes enhance "respect and dignity." The group explained their assessment as follows:
[D]ignified procedures tend to provoke favorable responses because
under them litigants feel that the court accords importance to the
persons and subject matter involved in the dispute. Thus, for our
tort litigants, the fact the court was willing to undertake a dignified
hearing of the dispute may have constituted evidence that63the civil
justice system took the litigants and the dispute seriously.
In the Special Master's approach, there is no real consideration of using process to send a message of dignity and respect. Rather than
listening to claimants, the program's goal seems to be to place significant sums of money in their hands on the assumption that this will
resolve all difficulties.
A second benefit of procedures that expand fairness by giving voice
is that they tend to enhance the public's sense of the legitimacy of the
processes in which they are used. Those looking from the outside at
adjudicatory processes seldom have many measures by which to judge
integrity and validity. In these circumstances, onlookers tend to rely
upon the presence of fair-looking procedures to help them measure
the value of the process. Tyler and his associates nicely summarize the
apparent train of public thought and its psychological implications:
61. See E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and Procedural
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in FairnessJudgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990).

62. E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L.F. Felsteiner, Deborah
R. Hensler. Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, The Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations
of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 953 (1990).
63. Id at 981.
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[A]bsent objective indicators of the correctness of a decision, the
best guarantee of a high-quality decision is the use of good-i.e.,
fair-procedures. Evaluations of the fairness of procedures serve as
a heuristic that allows people to quickly evaluate the correctness of
actions without 64
really weighing all the benefits and costs associated
with the action.

In the case of the September 11th Fund, there are no powerful public
signals of procedural fairness. What exists are caps, schedules, and an
aversion to hearings. As an abstract matter, it is hard to know
whether these will produce just results. Despite the Special Master's
request that he be trusted, the public is offered no reason to do so.
The absence of.a tangibly fair and participatory process denies the
Master the sort of legitimacy he seems to be seeking.
One might ask if substantial payouts by themselves may not solve
these problems. The answer seems to be that, in many settings, dollars
alone are not enough. Research suggests that dollars do not, by themselves, make mediation awards acceptable. As stakes rise, litigants appear to care more about procedural fairness. 65 If providing a lucrative
award will not suffice, what about providing other benefits like diminished processing costs and accelerated resolution? Research suggests
that these too are insufficient substitutes for perceived procedural
fairness. Lind and his colleagues noted the following about their elaborate real world study findings:
Some of the more striking findings of the current study involve the
absence of expected correlations involving procedural justice judgments. Especially remarkable is the finding that there was no consistent relationship between procedural justice judgments and the

objective 6 6measures of case outcome, litigation cost, or case
duration.

Satisfaction requires processes that are perceived to be fair and (at
least generally) lend voice to participants. The Fund approach is weak
on this score and negative reactions to it may be traced to this failing.
One last point deserving consideration is that procedures that are
perceived as lacking in fairness can have a negative impact on those
required to use them. On the personal level, such processes can result
in heightened levels of stress. 67 On a communal level, they can lead to
concerted political action seeking change. 68 The activities of a number of widows' and survivors' groups lend credence to the second of
64. TOM R. TYLER ET AL., supra note 60, at 100.

65. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
(1998).
66. E. Allan Lind et al., supra note 62, at 968.
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these observations. 6 9 In sum, procedures that give voice are important. Their absence in the September 11th Fund raises questions
about its efficacy and suggests that any similar efforts in the future
ought to focus on process concerns as well as financial ones. It is
ironic that with the best of intentions, the Special Master has, by his
benevolent but autocratic approach, damaged the credibility of the
process he has worked so diligently and honorably to accredit.
VI.

SOME LESSONS

It is hard to know what the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001 portends, if anything, for the future development of tort
and compensation law. The forces that led to the passage of the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act were unique in
American experience. Neither calamitous terrorist acts like the
Oklahoma City bombing nor man-made catastrophes like the asbestos
mass tort problem have ever prompted Congress to provide compensation to victims. It may be that the September 11th Fund is an anomaly ascribable to a peculiar and never to be repeated set of
occurrences. Legislation, however, has a way of assuming precedential proportions and the September 11th Fund may have opened a
number of doors.
What lessons might we derive from the actions of Congress and the
Special Master? One thing that is striking about the September 11th
Fund approach is that it embraces only one of the two traditional
goals of tort and negligence law, that of compensation. As to the
other goal, the creation of incentives for the avoidance of injury (often
loosely referred to as deterrence), the legislation is silent. The airlines
are relieved of all liability and will not have to pay damages out of
their own pockets. There is no fund-related fiscal motivation for the
airlines to try to do a better job in the future. What is more, the airlines actually received a huge bailout designed to secure their financial
well-being. If the move away from deterrence is precedential, perhaps
it marks the beginning of a shift from the economic rationality of
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,70 which emphasized the need for
parties to make safety-related expenditures when those expenditures
were smaller than the cost of the risk otherwise likely to arise. In
place of a scheme focused on encouraging private parties to seek
safety as part of rational economic behavior, the September 11th legislation substitutes a government payment program, at least when the
69. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92.
70. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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risk involved arises out of the criminal conduct of a third party (here
the hijackers). This approach runs contrary to a series of tort cases
that have expanded defendant liability for third-party criminal conduct when that conduct is deemed foreseeable and a special relationship exists between the defendant and either the third party or the
victim. Such an approach has been used to hold landlords liable for
criminal attacks on their tenants 7' and to hold psychotherapists liable
for the violent behavior of their patients. 72 The Victim Compensation
Fund sets off in an entirely different direction.
Intimately tied up with the abandonment of deterrence is a willingness to deduct collateral source payments (life insurance, pension payouts, etc.) from the awards made to victims. In traditional tort cases,
no reference could be made to collateral sources and they would not
be deducted from a plaintiff's award. 73 One of the reasons for this
was a concern that such a deduction would reduce both a negligent
defendant's burden for the loss that defendant had caused and the
incentive to behave carefully. If compensation schemes track the September 11th Fund approach and move away from concern with incentives, then collateral sources will be ever more frequently considered.
This is already the trend in the United States as more than a dozen
states, as part of "tort reform" efforts, have allowed consideration of
74
collateral sources.
The Special Master's approach to both economic loss and
noneconomic losses is significantly different from current tort doctrine. The Special Master seeks to establish a fixed schedule and presumed flat figure for these two losses respectively. The Special Master
strives to cut out subjective evaluation. He eliminates the need for a
communal assessment like that of a jury and makes the awarding of
damages a mechanical process. One is struck by the similarity of his
approach to that called for by tort reformers. In each case, caps on
damages (especially those without clear economic determinants) have
been the goal. Behind that goal appears to stand a strong desire to
rein in awards and make judgments more predictable.
The Fund has the intent of shifting adjudication away from trials to
paper and pencil assessments. Its strongest point has been the development of a reasonably sensible methodology for calculating the economic value of a lost life. That methodology takes some easily
71. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
73. On the subject of collateral source payments, see generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478 (1966).
74. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 692 (1996).
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discoverable numbers regarding income (generally established by tax
returns) and translates them into a defensible award. It does so by
recognizing additions to income (like fringe benefits) that increase
awards, by providing realistic figures for expected remaining working
life (it relies exclusively on male-only work life figures and, hence,
eliminates discriminations caused by historically sexist workforce patterns), and by fairly accounting for inflation and increasing worker
productivity. This approach places such calculations on a sensible and
fair footing. It generally (at least up to the ninety-eighth percentile of
income) produces awards that approximate real economic loss rather
than artificially inflated or deflated numbers. It is to be hoped that its
promulgation may have some effect on future trials regarding such
matters.
The Master's approach to noneconomic losses has already been discussed in some detail. One more point, however, deserves mention.
The Master stands present tort practice on its head with respect to
compensation for noneconomic losses suffered by surviving claimants.
Section 104.46 of the regulations provides:
The Special Master may determine the presumed noneconomic
losses for claimants who suffered physical harm (but did not die) by
relying upon the noneconomic losses described in Sec. 104.44 and
adjusting the losses based upon the extent of the victim's physical
harm. Such presumed losses7 5include any noneconomic component
of replacement services loss.
In context, the Special Master has indicated that surviving claimants
will be awarded less than those who died. In cases of serious injury
tried at common law, noneconomic injuries for survivors are generally
far larger than those for decedents. The reason for this is that the pain
and suffering experienced by the living victim continues throughout
his or her life, while that of a decedent is cut off at the time of death.
The rationale for the Master's shift from life-focused noneconomic
damages to death-focused ones is not explained. It may have to do
with replacement services (which may increase in the case of a death)
or with the generally minor injuries of those who escaped the World
Trade Center alive.
Until now, I have sought to evaluate the September 11th Fund on
its own terms as an effort at compensation. There is an argument to
be made, however, that at least a part of its true thrust is not compensation but something different-reparations. A compensation program seeks to pay for losses of one sort or another. It looks at what a
75. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274, 66,.287 (Dec. 21, 2001).
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victim has suffered and seeks to attach a dollar figure. Reparation,
according to Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary,is "making
amends, offering expiation, or giving satisfaction for a wrong or injury. ' 76 This implies something different from compensation, a desire
to act symbolically but tangibly to correct a wrong. Reparations may
be less tightly tied to out-of-pocket loss. They may reflect society's
regret or sense of responsibility. The scope of the noneconomic losses
provisions in the September 11th Fund legislation and their emphasis
on a speedy payout may signal not just a desire to compensate but to
redress a wrong or honor a sacrifice. In these ways, the September
11th Fund may have some of the same objectives as the Civil Liberties
Act of 1988, 77 which was intended to make restitution to Japanese
Americans interned or otherwise deprived of their liberty or property
during World War II by paying each $20,000. Reconceptualizing the
September 11th Fund as, at least in part, a reparations program may
help us understand a number of its requirements and give us some
guidance in how to apply it.

76. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
77. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988).
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